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ABSTRACT This article develops and defends a triadic account of structural domination,
according to which structural domination (e.g. patriarchy, white supremacy, capitalism) is a
triadic relation between dominator(s), dominated, and regulator(s)—the constitutive domina-
tion dyad plus those roles and norms expressively upholding it. The article elaborates on the
relationship between structure and agency from the perspective of both oppressor and oppressed
and discusses the deduction of the concept of the capitalist state from the concept of capitalism.
On the basis of these deﬁnitions, it shows that structural domination under capitalism presup-
poses collective power but no joint agency or shared intentions on the part of the dominators.
This article argues for the cogency of the idea of structural domination and for its appli-
cation to capitalist economic structure. The article develops and defends a triadic
account of structural domination, according to which structural domination (e.g. patri-
archy, white supremacy, capitalism) is a three-place relation between dominator(s), dom-
inated, and regulator(s)— the constitutive domination dyad plus those roles and norms
expressively upholding it. The article elaborates on the relationship between structure
and agency from the perspective of oppressor and oppressed and discusses the deduction
of the concept of the capitalist state from the concept of capitalism. On the basis of these
deﬁnitions, it shows that structural domination under capitalism presupposes collective
power but no joint agency or shared intentions on the part of the dominators.
The article has two parts. The ﬁrst, conceptual, part argues that structural domina-
tion is a triadic relation. The second, normative, part applies that idea to capitalist
domination. More precisely, Section 1 sketches two accounts of the wrong- or bad-
making features of domination. Section 2 introduces the triadic account of structural
domination. Sections 3 and 4 use that account to offer a deﬁnition of structural domi-
nation. Section 5 argues for the idea that the capital relation, the relation between cap-
ital and labour, is one of domination. Section 6 explains under what conditions that
domination becomes structural, that is, under what conditions the domination of capi-
tal over labour is structural. Section 7 argues that capitalist domination is a form of
alienated collective power that does not presuppose collective agency.
What is domination?
The account of structural domination provided in this article is meant to be compati-
ble with any theory of what makes domination wrongful or bad. I now brieﬂy sketch
two such theories: neo-republican and neo-Aristotelian.
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Neo-republicans object to the existence of arbitrary, uncontrolled, or unchecked
power, on grounds of domination. Philip Pettit, for example, deﬁnes domination as
subjection to arbitrary power, where arbitrariness is deﬁned as failure to promote or
track the interests of those subject to power. Starting from this set of claims about
domination, neo-republicans have developed theories about the domination of women
under patriarchy1 and of workers under capitalism.2
Neo-Aristotelians object not to the existence of arbitrary power, as such, but rather
to the nature of the action that power facilitates. Suppose A has power over B and is
disposed to use it. These are two power facts. Most social relations involve power
facts: a doctor has power over her patient, a teacher over the student, a coach over an
athlete, and so on. When things go well, the motivations of the patient (in taking the
medicine), of the student (in reading the book), and of the athlete (in running the
marathon) do not reﬂect the power facts. That is, these actions are performed for the
sake of values independent of the respective dispositions of powerful doctors, teachers,
and coaches. Contrast the power of the slaveowner over the slave, of the highwayman
over the rambler, of the husband over the wife in the patriarchal family. All three cases
seem to involve action that is not constitutively motivated by the appropriate values.
What explains the difference between the two sets of cases?
The answer is that in the latter set of cases (slaves, ramblers, wives), B’s normative
reasons to do what A, the proposer, proposes do not constitutively track values that
are independent of the power facts. That is, each of these proposers, in his role as
slaveowner, highwayman, and husband, fails to help B perform the power-directed act
for some power-independent reason across possible worlds. Conversely, on the neo-
Aristotelian view, non-dominating power constitutively facilitates action motivated by
the power-independent value across possible worlds; the proposer empowers the pro-
posee’s recognition of, and reaction to, that value.3
What matters for my purposes is that both accounts of domination, neo-republican
and neo-Aristotelian, entail a distinction between constitutively and contingently free
action, in some relevant sense of ‘free’. A contingently free action is a free action that
obtains by the leave of another. Constitutively free actions, by contrast, are upheld
across possible worlds—in the cases that interest us, they are structurally upheld for the
sake of independent values. Neo-republicans and neo-Aristotelians share the further
view that only constitutively free actions are undominated: the slave, wife, or worker who
performs free actions by the leave of her (ostensibly benevolent) master, husband, or
boss is still dominated.
This article studies these possibilities by elaborating on the structural nature of
domination complaints, when they are structural.
The structure of structural domination
I begin by studying the logic of structural domination. Cages, cathedrals, molecules,
and propositions have structures. To say that a cathedral has a structure is to say that
there is a relation between its parts—wall, buttress, nave, and tower. The constituents
of this structure constitute the cathedral, not its structure. It follows that the cathedral
structure can survive even if all its constituent parts are replaced: Notre Dame Cathe-
dral’s structure would survive even if all its walls and buttresses were simultaneously
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replaced. The same is true of social structures. Consider prisons. Simultaneous whole-
sale replacement of all of a prison’s constituents—its staff, cells, bricks, or mortar—
need not affect its structure. The question is what constitutes that structure.
This section argues that a complete description of speciﬁcally structural power rela-
tions involves a triadic relationship between those who possess power, those who are
subject to power, and certain third parties—role occupants or norms—whom I will call
regulators.
Structural power relations in general
Consider:
Promise relation - Promisor promises Promisee to give her a copy of Crime and
Punishment.
Promises are institutional facts4 that confer on Promisee a power over Promisor—the
power to demand or waive compliance with Promisor’s antecedently undertaken obli-
gation. Call this the constitutive power dyad. The institution of promising deﬁnes, in
addition to ofﬁces (such as promisor/promisee), moves (under what conditions the
utterance ‘I promise’ counts as a promise), penalties for non-compliance, and so on.
Now contrast:
Promise structure - Promisor promises Promisee to give her a copy of Crime
and Punishment. Regulator is a bystander disposed to reward Promisor’s com-
pliance with her obligation and to penalise non-compliance.
Regulator’s addition to the example completes the structure (or practice)5 of promis-
ing: regulators deﬁne ofﬁces and legitimate moves, in addition to instituting and
enforcing pay-offs corresponding to these moves. Regulators thereby impart structure
on the promise relation by stabilising existing ofﬁces and by providing assurance of
compliance to their ofﬁceholders—a function that requires at least the semblance of
independence from these ofﬁces. That is, even when the regulators are existing ofﬁce-
holders, their actions do not exemplify their ofﬁces as such: Promisor, for example, is
not exercising her ofﬁce as promisor—is not promising—when she takes steps to ensure
that she can perform promises in the future. That is the job of regulator.
A complete description of any structural power relation therefore involves a three-
place relation between the ofﬁceholders of the constitutive power dyad6 plus the regu-
lators (in this case: Promisor, Promisee, Regulator). In other words:
(1) Structural power relations are triadic relations.
In terms of our original cathedral analogy, regulators relate to the constitutive power
dyad in the way cathedral roofs relate to cathedral walls: without the roof, the walls
are unstable and, in a sense, structurally incomplete. Bases need superstructures.7
I now argue for:
(2) Structural domination is a structural power relation.
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Structural domination is triadic
Consider:
Interpersonal domination - Man ﬁnds Woman in a pit. Man can get Woman
out at little cost or difﬁculty, but he demands an extortionate price to do so.
Man would have done the same to a man, and a man could just as easily have
found himself in the pit.
Suppose that this power relation is objectionable, such that Man dominates Woman.
Still, Man does not dominate as man;8 Man’s domination of Woman is merely inter-
personal. Contrast:
Structural domination - Regulator pushes women, and only women, into pits.
Regulator pushes Woman into a pit. This enables Man to demand an extor-
tionate price from Woman in return for extracting her from the pit.
In this example, Regulator confers structure to the domination relation, in exactly the
same way Regulator confers structure to the promise relation.9 More precisely, Regu-
lator makes the domination structural and gives it its discriminating character (as a
form of sexist domination). Something similar is true of white supremacy and, I will
argue, of capitalism.
In the examples used so far, the regulators help constitute the constitutive power
dyad while remaining somehow external to it. External in what sense? Consider the
relationship between cathedral wall and roof. Cathedral walls have powers, including
the power to support each other. What confers that power on each wall, let us sup-
pose, is the cathedral’s roof. But what confers a power is not identical10 with that power
or with its possessor; to think otherwise is to commit the vehicle fallacy. So roofs can
co-constitute the power of walls (e.g. the power to support other walls), but lack that
power themselves; roofs regulate the constitutive power relation between walls. I claim
that all instances of structural domination have the same triadic structure: they involve
pit-like dyads constituted by third-party entities—the regulators—who complete the triad.
Figure 1 elaborates the triadic relation graphically. To summarise the conceptual
part of the argument:
(1) Structural power relations are triadic relations.
(2) Structural domination is a structural power relation.
∴ (3) Structural domination is a triadic relation. (From [1] and [2])
Suppose this argument is sound, such that structural domination involves a relationship
between dominator P, dominated Q, and regulator R. Note that P and Q might them-
selves be regulators, although not in their roles as dominator/dominated: when the play-
ground bully exhorts her friends to bully vulnerable others, she is not bullying; rather,
she is making (future) bullying possible. In so doing, she acts as regulator, not as bully.
It now follows that the existence of regulators constrains dominators to act in cer-
tain ways, including ways that constitute the domination of others (recall that roofs
regulate, and, in so doing, constrain what walls can do). It does not follow, and it is
false, that dominators are unfree qua dominators. That prison guards or slaveowners
are structurally constrained to do what constitutes the domination of prisoners or
slaves does not make prison guards and slaveowners unfree.11 To think otherwise is to
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confuse the domination’s conditions of possibility or ground (i.e. the regulators) with
its subject (i.e. the dominators). By implication, advocates of the idea that structures
can themselves dominate confuse grounds with subjects.
Drawing on the set of claims defended in this section, I now offer a deﬁnition of
structural domination.
Structural = Regulated
The triadic account of structural domination implies the following deﬁnition of struc-
tural domination:
Regulated Domination – A given instance of domination is structural just when
it involves a triadic relationship between powerful agent(s) P, disempowered
agent(s) Q, and regulator(s) R, such that (i) P dominates Q and (ii) R regu-
lates that domination.
According to the triadic account of structural domination, this means regulated domina-
tion, that is, domination co-constituted by agents, roles, or norms external to the con-
stitutive power dyad. Call this the regulation condition.12 The regulation condition does
not, by itself, tell us what domination does to the dominated. Consider common stock
instances of the patriarchy: the wife-abusing husband, the lecherous male boss, the
pornographer who stigmatises women. What makes these instances of structural domi-
nation?
A possibility that suggests itself is that women under the patriarchy are confronted
with a dilemma between performing an independently valuable activity by the leave of
men and not performing it at all. The wife abuser, for example, dominates his wife, in
the sense that she must either perform unfree actions (e.g. have sex in order to avoid
being beaten) or perform free actions (e.g. sex for pleasure) by the leave of her hus-
band. Similarly, when pornographic norms restrict access to empowering sexual possi-
bilities for women, such that women have to choose between unfree actions (e.g. sex
Figure 1. Regulated domination
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on the model of male fantasy) and merely contingently free actions (e.g. sex by the
leave of those who have internalised that model), they are dominated. Call this the
double-bind condition.13
Regulated Domination is a modal deﬁnition of structural domination, in two senses.
In the ﬁrst place, it says that structural domination is not just about the actual choices
of structurally dominated agents or groups, but also about their subjunctive choices.
That is, according to this deﬁnition, Q is dominated even in the nearby possible world
in which she abstains from any interaction with P: the unmarried woman in a patriar-
chal society and the celibate woman in the pornography-saturated society are both
dominated. In the second place, the deﬁnition explains a modal feature of structurally
dominated choice, namely the clustering of subaltern optimising behaviour around the
disjunction of unfree action and contingently free action. The thicker the bars, the
thicker the clustering, and the fewer the opportunities for the undominated option of
constitutively free, mutually afﬁrming activity.
To conclude this section: I have offered a triadic deﬁnition of domination and sug-
gested that this deﬁnition fares well in some of the cases that exercise feminists. I now
ask what counts as a regulator in the deﬁnition of structural domination.
Deﬁning the regulation function
A regulator is any agent, role, or internalised norm that contributes appropriately to
the creation, reproduction, or perpetuation of the constitutive power dyad.14 The
question is what counts as ‘appropriately’. I consider three possible speciﬁcations of
the regulation function: causal, expressive, and moralised.
a) Causal regulation: R is a regulator just when R contributes causally to P’s domina-
tion of Q.
b) Expressive regulation: R is a regulator just when R contributes expressively to P’s
domination of Q.
c) Moralised regulation: R is a regulator just when R is morally responsible or other-
wise blameworthy for P’s domination of Q.
Speciﬁcation (a) is too weak. Suppose I trip over a wire, causing the leader of the fem-
inist revolution to fall on a bus, causing her to die, causing the patriarchy to survive. I
have causally contributed to the reproduction or perpetuation of the patriarchy. But
my tripping is an expression of maladroitness, not of the patriarchy: I am no regulator.
So (a) is false.15
On speciﬁcation (b), my behaviour must somehow express the constitutive power
dyad, indeed expressively uphold it. In other words, to count as a regulator, I must, in
principle, be able to interpret my action as a move imbued with salient institutional
meaning, even if I am not morally responsible for its (possibly oppression perpetuat-
ing) consequences. On speciﬁcation (c), if I succeed in dissociating myself morally
from P’s domination of Q, I am a non-regulator. The feminist husband under patri-
archy and the republican prince under monarchy are not regulators, according to (c).
Of these three speciﬁcations, (a) is too weak, while (c) seems too strong. For the pur-
poses of this essay, I shall exclude (a) and remain non-committal between (b) and (c).
© 2020 The Authors. Journal of Applied Philosophy published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Society for Applied
Philosophy.
6 VROUSALIS
This concludes my discussion of the logic of structural domination. I now turn to
the normative part of the argument. In what follows, I apply Regulated Domination to a
speciﬁc kind of market structure: capitalist economic structure.
How capitalists dominate
This section argues that capitalism satisﬁes Regulated Domination. It is therefore an
instance of structural domination, the domination of labour by capital. I begin by dis-
cussing the nature of the capital relation. I then explain how the addition of the state
helps impart structure to that relation, that is, explains the constitution of domination
under capitalist economic structure. Consider:
Capital relation - Capital owns money, Labour does not. Labour needs means
of consumption, which she cannot obtain without money. So Labour places
her labour at Capital’s disposal, in return for money. Capital appropriates
Labour’s labour, sells its product for money, returns half the money to
Labour, and pockets the other half as proﬁt.
The capital relation, in general, is value-constituted control over labour, or, more suc-
cinctly, a form of monetised servitude.16 It follows that capital is not fundamentally a
property or class relation, although it presupposes both private property and class divi-
sion. Recall that roofs can co-constitute a power relation—say, of wall over wall—with-
out being identical with or reducible to that power relation. By the same token,
property can co-constitute the capital relation without being identical with or reducible
to that relation.17 If I am right, the capital relation is, fundamentally, a form of reiﬁed
control over labour: it is reiﬁcation that makes the capital relation conceptually and
historically distinctive.18
Now note that, although the capital relation presupposes the existence of private
property in commodities—that is, a market for means of consumption— and money,
it does not presuppose the existence of private property in the means of production. This
is both a historical fact—the capital relation predates the capitalist mode of production
—and a conceptual necessity—pre-capitalist forms of merchant and usury capital are
instances of the capital relation, but they do not presuppose private ownership in the
means of production.19 It follows that the capital relation does not presuppose wage-
labour: Capital can come to have reiﬁed control over Labour’s labour through a credit
market, or through mere market exchange.20
Suppose I am right that the abstract capital relation need not involve propertyless
workers or a labour market. I will defend that assumption in the next subsection. The
question now is how the capital relation is reproduced, or, which is the same thing,
how it is imbedded in social institutions. Contrast:
Capitalist structure - Capital owns the cookshop; she gives propertyless Labour
a cooking job. In labour market equilibrium, So Labour places her labour at
Capital’s disposal, in return for money. Capital appropriates Labour’s labour,
sells its product for money, returns half the money to Labour in the form of a
wage, and pockets the other half as proﬁt.
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Unlike Capital relation, Capitalist structure posits the existence of a labour market,
which presupposes the existence wage labour. Note that Capitalist structure relates to
Capital relation in the same way that Promise structure relates to Promise relation: the
structure—capitalism—is a concrete expression of the abstract power relation at the
centre of the structure, the relation between capital and labour. If it can be shown that
this relation is necessarily one of domination, then the structure that contains it—that
is, the triadic relation of dominator, dominated, and regulator—will, necessarily, beto-
ken structural domination. I now argue for this conclusion, namely:
(4) Capitalism is an instance of structural domination.
Unfreedom in the market
The thought behind (4) is as follows. For as long as the proﬁt motive reigns supreme
as the mainspring of human productive activity, constitutively free production will
remain impossible, and the exploitation of human by human will remain inevitable.
Contrast a system in which state, market, and workplace are constitutively geared
towards making free production available. This would make such production non-con-
tingent on the extraction of surplus labour and proﬁt. It would thereby disconnect
social reproduction from the realisation of proﬁt, making constitutively free production
possible. And since constitutively free production includes production performed for
the sake of putting goods to their most socially productive uses, price and value might
survive in the free society, but only in their allocative functions. The next two subsec-
tions elaborate.
Economists distinguish between two roles of markets: allocative and distributive.
The allocative role consists in communicating relative scarcity to appropriately situated
agents. Leon Walras famously described markets as spatiotemporally extended auc-
tions, in which the auctioneer announces the relative scarcity value of widgets, given
total demand for all marketed goods, including widgets. In its allocative role, the mar-
ket seems morally unobjectionable; it merely signals relative scarcities. It is different
with the market’s distributive role—a role built into the capital relation. Let me
explain.
The capital relation, introduced above, presupposes that Labour lacks adequate
non-market access to her means of subsistence. This lack confers on Capital control
over a portion of the product of Labour’s labour. What must be shown is that this
makes Labour’s action dominated, whether along neo-republican or neo-Aristotelian
lines. Insofar as Capital’s role is distributive, that is, consists in providing Labour with
non-moral incentives, it satisﬁes both the neo-republican and the neo-Aristotelian deﬁ-
nitions of domination. For, under the capital relation, Capital’s relation to Labour is
one of subjection to power,21 for the purpose of making a proﬁt.22 The performance
of free production, in other words, is contingent on sufﬁcient proﬁtability for the own-
ers of the means of production.
It now follows that Capital dominates Labour, even if Labour’s production is con-
tingently free (e.g. Labour performs meaningful work for a decent employer). The
double bind of capital thus consists in either producing unfreely, such as cooking-for-
money or producing freely, such as cooking-for-the-sake-of-its-value, but only by the
leave of capital. This is how capitalism, patriarchy, and white supremacy are
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structurally homologous: all three restrict the choice sets of the subaltern to a dilemma
between unfree action and merely contingently free action. The worker with the
decent job under capitalism, the woman with the feminist husband under patriarchy,
and the non-white person with the anti-racist white companions under white supre-
macy are all dominated in that sense.
I conclude that Capital dominates Labour in Capital relation.23 And since Capitalist
structure is but a regulated instance of Capital relation, it follows that Capitalist structure
necessarily involves domination. A typical expression of that structure is the capitalist
labour market. Wage labour— Labour paid to obey Capital—is dominated labour.
I now brieﬂy explain how markets can be made to serve constitutively free actions,
as opposed to domination.
Freedom in the market
Joseph Carens defends a system of market-based, proﬁt-maximising ﬁrms, whose prof-
its get redistributed after production, such that the post-tax distribution is egalitarian,
in the appropriate metric.24 Carensian socialism enlists a set of moral incentives in
production, which, in conjunction with redistribution, engender equality. Unlike some
of Carens’ defenders,25 I do not take this to be a representation of an idealised form
of socialism. Rather, Carens presents a stylised picture of how we might harness the
allocative function of markets without the distributive; that is, have markets without
capitalism. In this picture, it is false that powerful market actors have dominating
power over others; they only act as trafﬁc regulators of sorts. Let me explain.
Contrast a boss under capitalism (Bill) with a boss under Carensian socialism
(Rosa). Bill and Rosa issue instructions to Labour, who does the cooking: ‘make the
omelette with mushrooms, not tomatoes’. This instruction gives Labour reasons to
prefer mushrooms to tomatoes, regardless of whether Bill or Rosa utters it. But Bill’s
utterance has a different structural role from Rosa’s. When Bill utters the instruction,
Labour correctly understands that if she uses mushrooms, she might get a pay rise; if
she uses tomatoes, she might get ﬁred. When Rosa utters the instruction, however,
Labour correctly understands that, if she uses mushrooms, she is saving social
resources; if she uses tomatoes, she is wasting them.
So under the Carensian system, prices and wages possess a signalling function only:
all they do is communicate independently valuable information, that is, information
about relative scarcities.26 It is as if the Walrasian auctioneer jumped out of the eggs,
yolks running down his forehead, shouting: ‘Make it with mushrooms!’ In this world,
there is no real private property, no real power of bosses over workers—other than that
authorised by power-independent allocative requirements—and no reiﬁed control over
labour; markets expressively uphold constitutively free production. Under the capitalist
system, by contrast, markets assume the form of an alien power, standing over and in
opposition to the direct producer; the worker and the means of production therefore
become irreconcilable through the familiar Walrasian mechanism.27 So Rosa helps
Labour perform constitutively free production; Bill does not. And this is why Bill’s
power, unlike Rosa’s, dominates Labour.
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Capital entails the state
The normative part of the argument so far has gone as follows:
(3) Structural domination is a triadic relation.
(4) Capitalism is an instance of structural domination.
∴ (5) Capitalist structural domination is a triadic relation. (From [3] and [4])
The move from the dyadic Capital relation to the triadic Capitalist structure requires the
addition of a regulator. Who is the regulator under capitalism? By the deﬁnition of a
regulator, we need an agent, role, or norm that appropriately contributes to Capital’s
domination of Labour. One plausible candidate is the capitalist state, the main enforcer
of private property in the means of production. Consider cookshops, for example.
Modernity lends expression to the private ownership of cookshops through the institu-
tion of property law.28 Property law, in turn, requires a legal system, which, in turn,
requires (something like) a state. Capitalist structure, in other words, presupposes a
regulator-in-chief, the capitalist state.29
The concept of capitalism therefore entails the concept of the capitalist state. More
precisely, the application of Regulated Domination to capitalism yields the concept of
the capitalist state:
(6) The capitalist state completes the triad of capitalist structural domination.
The capitalist state regulates the capital relation, by instituting, justifying, and enforc-
ing, among other things: (i) Capital’s control over Labour’s conditions of production,
(ii) Labour’s control over her own labour power, and (iii) the exercise of these control
rights through the institution of contract. This incidence of control rights confers on
Capital power over Labour’s labour, in two ways: Capital comes to control access to
consumption goods and to the means used to produce them. The structural triad
(dominator, dominated, regulator) thus takes the form (capitalist, worker, state).30 So:
(7) Capitalism presupposes the capitalist state. (From [4], [5], [6])
Kant and Nozick are therefore right to deduce an idea of the state from the very idea
of private property, in conjunction with certain generalisations about the nature of
right.31 But both signally and consequentially fail to note that such a state is compati-
ble with the monetised mastery of the propertied over the propertyless and, conversely,
with the monetised servitude of the propertyless to the propertied. Marx and Engels
do not so fail, when they note that ‘Communism deprives no man of the power to
appropriate the products of society; all that it does is to deprive him of the power to
subjugate the labour of others by means of such appropriations.’32
Time to take stock. I have argued for a triadic deﬁnition of structural domination
and for its application to capitalist structure. The capital relation, I argued, is mone-
tised control over the labour of others. Insofar as this control obstructs constitutively
free actions, it is an instance of domination. And when it is appropriately regulated,
this domination is structural. Capital’s principal regulator is the capitalist state. Table 1
broaches possible placeholders of the triadic relation in the cases of capitalism, white
supremacy, and patriarchy.
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Collective and individual agency
This section argues that capitalist structural domination does not, in general, presup-
pose shared agency or joint action.33 On a widely held view, due to Michael Bratman
and Margaret Gilbert,34 joint action requires shared intentions, that is, P’s and Q’s
intentions that P and Q perform an act, each by doing her part in that performance.
These shared intentions must, moreover, ‘mesh’, in the sense that the content of P’s
participatory intention must cohere with Q’s.
I now show that the joint regulation of a dominating power relation—its regulation
by a multitude of agents— is not sufﬁcient for shared agency or joint action, in the
Bratman/Gilbert sense. If I am right, then the idea that capitalists jointly possess a
power over workers does not presuppose shared agency. Capital, in other words, is col-
lectively power conferring but agentless. Consider:
Catallaxy Prison - Catallaxy prison has 990 prisoners and 10 guards. Some
guards are former prisoners: they achieve guardhood by squeezing through
the (few available) cell loopholes. The size of these loopholes is subject to
capacity constraints, including the rate of growth of the prison and guard rule
over the prison itself. The proportion of guards in the total population ends
up hovering at around 1% for the whole duration of the prison’s long exis-
tence, through nobody’s plan or intentional design.
In Catallaxy Prison, prisoners squeeze into guardhood from the prison population, sub-
ject to capacity constraints and guard rule over prisoners. By assumption, there is a
feasible prisonless alternative, in which all 1000 humans are free, but where there are
no longer guards and prisoners, such that the former are worse off and the latter better
off. The guards therefore have an interest in maintaining prison structure. It does not
follow that they have shared and meshing intentions, that they optimise by forming
them, or that they optimise by accepting some collective-decision procedure as
theirs.35
By way of illustration, consider prison guards P1 and P2. P1 knows that it is in P2’s
interest not to let too many prisoners through the prison loophole; the same is true of
P2. By the deﬁnition of structure, moreover, all guards are symmetrically disposed.
But then neither P1 nor P2 need have any intention that they enforce discipline or con-
trol the loophole together; it is consistent with their collective exercise of power that
they lack shared intentions of the Bratman/Gilbert variety. P1, for example, violates no
requirement of rationality if she gets on with enforcing discipline, all the while expect-
ing— falsely, as it turns out—that P2 will fail to do her part.
Table 1. Triads of structural domination
Dominator Dominated Regulator
Patriarchy Men Women States, sexists, sexist norms
White Supremacy Whites Non-whites States, racists, racist norms
Capitalism Capitalists Workers States, capitalists, market norms
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More generally, the reproduction of domination in Catallaxy Prison only requires
that: (i) individual guards are motivated by self-interest, (ii) what serves the guards’
collective self-interest serves their individual self-interest,36 (iii) the guards are individ-
ually capable and willing to enforce their collective self-interest, and (iv) these facts
are common knowledge. Claim (iii) is subject to a free-rider objection: how do indi-
vidual guards ensure that other guards enforce discipline? The exact answer is irrele-
vant to our purposes; perhaps, acting as regulators of the prison relation, the guards
monitor each other’s performance, punish defection, and reward cooperation. It does
not follow that they have shared intentions or, yet more strongly, meshing shared
intentions. So the collective power of prison guards does not presuppose shared
agency, on their part. It is similar with the collective power of capitalists.37
There is, however, a way that capitalism might indirectly presuppose collective
agency. Consider the following argument:
(7) Capitalism presupposes the capitalist state.
(8) The state is a collective agent.
∴ (9) Capitalism presupposes collective agency. (From [7] and [8])
If (8) is true, then the main regulator of the capital relation is a collective agent. In
which case it follows, by (5), that capitalism is a triadic relation between two agentless
processes (capital and labour) regulated by a collective agent. I have no quarrel with
(8). But I now show that the soundness of the argument just rehearsed does not
impugn the idea that capitalist structural domination is agentless. This can be
glimpsed by the following variant of Catallaxy Prison:
Prison Warden - Same set-up as in Catallaxy Prison. The only difference is that
the guards and prisoners jointly elect a warden. The warden is elected from
the whole population of prisoners and guards through universal suffrage. Her
mandate is to promote the quality of life of both guards and prisoners, subject
to capacity constraints. Thanks to a long-lasting overlapping consensus
between guards and prisoners, the proportion of guards in the total popula-
tion ends up hovering at around 1% for the whole duration of the prison’s
long existence, through nobody’s plan or intentional design.
In Prison Warden, the conditions for collective agency are satisﬁed:38 the warden’s
election is a joint action by the population of guards and prisoners. But the existence
and reproduction of prison structure itself are not (the upshot of) joint agency; nor do
they presuppose any such agency. In other words, it is entirely consistent with Prison
Warden that guards and prisoners lack any intention to reproduce prison structure and
that each lacks any intention to do her part in that reproduction. So, once again, the
collective power of the guards over the prisoners does not entail shared agency on
their part.
Liberal capitalism is like Prison Warden, in that liberal capitalism allows forms of
(democratic) shared agency subject to capitalist structural domination. More impor-
tantly, Prison Warden captures a distinctive feature of that domination: much like the
power of the prison guard, capitalist power can reproduce itself spontaneously, without
shared and meshing intentions on the part of capitalists. Perhaps for that reason, it
can—by dint of periodic elections, welfare provision, trade unionism, co-
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determination, and other palliatives—systematically conceal its nature as a form of
structural domination.39
Conclusion
This article has argued for the cogency of the idea of structural domination and for
application of that idea to capitalist economic structure. Capitalism, I have argued, is
a cage—much like patriarchy and white supremacy. The article defended these claims
by offering a triadic account of structural domination, according to which structural
domination is a three-place relation between dominator, dominated, and regulator—
any role holders or norms that contribute appropriately to the constitutive domination
dyad. The article concluded that capitalist domination presupposes the capitalist state
but not collective agency.
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means they are structurally constrained to penalise the noncompliance of other capitalists with the proﬁt-
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